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INTRODUCTION
The United States Government is increasing its efforts to stem
the flow of technological information from the United States to for-
eign nations, particularly the Soviet Union.' The federal govern-
ment controls the international transfer of arms technology through
the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR),2 a set of
export licensing procedures that includes a system of prior restraints
of domestic publications.3 This Note analyzes the constitutionality
of the ITAR restraints under the first amendment 4 as applied to pub-
lic cryptography 5 publications and finds that the ITAR is an uncon-
stitutional prior restraint of public cryptography publications. The
1. See Abrams, The New Effort to ControlInformation, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1983,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 22; see generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT TO
THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT ON
THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY: AN AGENDA OF NATIONAL SECUR-
rry IssUEs (Comm. Print 1978); REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS
TOGETHER WITH ASSESSMENT OF THE REPORT BY THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY (Comm. Print 1978) (prepared
for the House Comm. on International Relations).
2. 22 C.F.R. §§ 121-30 (1983).
3. See infra notes 86-111 and accompanying text.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I. cl. 2 ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press .... ").
5. Public cryptography is the use and development of codes by private persons,
without government funds or information, for nongovernmental purposes. Cryptogra-
phy is a mathematical science that transforms information into codes to prevent unau-
thorized persons or governments from reading the encoded information. Cryptanalysis,
or code-breaking, is the related mathematical science of deciphering encoded informa-
tion. Cryptology encompasses both cryptography and cryptanalysis. See Handelman,
Special report: Cryptographic research and the national security, SIAM News, June 1981,
at 1, col. 3 (bimonthly newspaper of the Society for Industrial and Applied
Mathematics).
CRYPTOGRAPHY AND EXPORT CONTROLS
Note concludes by proposing to replace the ITAR with a limited sys-
tem of prepublication review that would both satisfy the first amend-
ment6 and protect United States national security.
Section I describes the recent emergence of the public cryptog-
raphy industry and the federal government's concerns with the
industry's potential to harm national security. Section I also dis-
cusses various federal attempts to control the industry, including the
use of the ITAR prior restraints. Section II explores the history and
operation of the ITAR and explains how it restrains public cryptog-
raphy publications. Section III traces the development of first
amendment protections against prior restraints and describes the
procedural requirements necessary for a constitutional system of
restraints; it concludes that the ITAR does not provide the required
procedures. Section IV discusses a national security exception to the
first amendment that may operate to uphold an otherwise unconsti-
tutional prior restraint. The section finds that the ITAR is not within
the national security exception, primarily due to the ITAR's ques-
tionable congressional authorization and conflicting legislative histo-
ries. Section V provides a proposal for legislation that would
authorize limited prepublication review of public cryptography
research.
I




Cryptology has existed as long as people have sought to shield
their communications from uninvited eyes. Treatises on cryptology
date back to the fourteenth century,7 and the science has experienced
exponential growth since World War 11.8 Until the last few years,
only governments made extensive use of cryptology.9 But recent
progress in telecommunications and computer technologies has cre-
6. Denial of an ITAR license for a public cryptography publication and the subse-
quent loss of revenue to the author may constitute an unconstitutional taking of property
under the fifth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation."), because the ITAR provides no compensa-
tion to the author. This possibly unconstitutional aspect of the ITAR is beyond the scope
of this Note. See generally The Government's Class/fcation of Private Ideas: Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm on Government Operations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
7. See Handelman, supra note 5, at 1, col. 4.
8. See generally J. BAMFORD, THE PUZZLE PALACE 338-63 (1982).
9. See Kahn, The Public's Secrets, CRYPrOLOGIA, Jan. 1981, at 20.
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ated a demand for private encryption devices and techniques.10
Consequently, a new industry, public cryptography, has emerged to
meet this growing demand.1 This industry increasingly is adorned
with esoteric journals, conferences and symposia, 12 hallmarks of a
promising American growth technology.
The emergence of the public cryptograpy industry is of concern
to the U. S. Government. The federal government views the indus-
try as a threat to federal security interests because of the industry's
potential to expose weaknesses in the code systems used by the U. S.
Government. In addition, the government fears that the industry
inadvertently may alert other nations to the United States' ability to
decipher their secret communications. 13
A. PUBLIC CRYPTOGRAPHY IS A GROWTH INDUSTRY
An increasing amount of sensitive information is transmitted
over and accessible through unguarded telephone wires and micro-
waves. "[T]he U.S. banking system alone moves some $400 billion
by computer around the country every day .... ,14 Commercial
interests and private individuals want to protect the security and
confidentiality of this information.' 5 Their concern with the security
and privacy of electronically stored data is heightened by technologi-
cal advances making electronic eavesdropping and unauthorized
data manipulation relatively easy, cheap, and discreet.' 6 This con-
cern has given rise to commercial markets and research in nongov-
ernmental encryption methods and devices. 17 Courses in cryptology
10. See Lipman, Computer-Fraud Coverage GrowsAs Insurers Solve Policy Problems,
Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1983, at 35, col. 4.
11. Handelman, supra note 5, at 4, col. 4.
12. See id at 4, col. 1.
13. See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
14. Faffick, Opening the "Trapdoor Knapsack," TIME, Oct. 25, 1982, at 88.
15. Encryption methods and devices have been proposed or adopted for insurance
files, medical records, and electronic fund transfer systems used by major financial insti-
tutions. See Buck, Public Crytography Study Group - A Report to the Society, NOTICES
OF THE AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL SOCIETY, Oct. 1981, at 517. Encryption and scram-
bling devices are used regularly by many companies on the Fortune 500 list of America's
largest corporations. See Kahn, supra note 9, at 22-23. The Federal Reserve Bank oper-
ates an underground computer system that handles the transfer of $198,000,000,000 daily
between banks. The computer system is specially designed to withstand the effects of a
nuclear attack. See Katz, Mountain of Money, Washington Post, Jan. 30, 1983 (Maga-
zine), at 22.
16. It is difficult to calculate national losses from electronic theft but estimates range
from $100,000,000 to $3,000,000,000 annually. These estimates include theft from elec-
tronic fund transfer systems, the U. S. Government, and credit card accounts, as well as
corporate embezzlement. See Huntley, Keyboard Bandits Who Want to Steal Your
Money, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 27, 1982, at 68-69.
17. In 1978 United States exports of cryptologic devices were valued at $800,000. In
1979 they totalled $1,800,000. See HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERamT OPERATIONs, THE
CRYPTOGRAPHYAND EXPORT CONTROLS
are now offered at academic institutions across the country, where
increasing numbers of mathematicians pursue applied and theoreti-
cal cryptology research, 18 and numerous private businesses are
entering the growing public cryptography market. 19 As the number
of computer terminals in American homes and offices increases, the
demand to secure the confidentiality of stored information is likely
to grow.
B. THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY VIEWS THE PUBLIC
CRYPTOGRAPHY INDUSTRY AS A THREAT TO NATIONAL
SECURITY
To have an effective foreign policy and adequate national secur-
ity safeguards, the federal government must secure the confidential-
ity of sensitive communications and information. The achievement
and maintenance of these goals require that the government be able
to monitor the transfer of information by other governments and be
able to intercept the communications of parties known to pose a
threat to national interests. The federal government relies heavily on
the science of cryptology for the realization of these ends. 20 The
National Security Agency (NSA), the federal government's code
bureau, is responsible for ensuring that federal communications and
data are secure and that the government is able to intercept and to
decipher foreign states' codes. 21 The NSA's duties include designing
codes to protect U. S. Government information, intercepting and
deciphering foreign communications, and monitoring international
messages to and from the United States.22
The NSA grew out of the American intelligence forces of World
War 1123 and is now the largest bureaucratic entity in the American
intelligence community.24 It has no legislative authorization; a still
GovERNMEN's CLASSIFICATIONS OF PRIVATE IDEAS, H.R. REP. No. 1540, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 72 (1980) [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT].
18. See BAMFORD, supra note 8, at 350.
19. Id at 340-49.
20. See generaly id
21. See House Hearings, supra note 6, at 423-26 (testimony of Adm. B.R. Inman,
Director, National Security Agency). For an in-depth discussion of the NSA and its
operations, see generally BAMFORD, supra note 8.
22. See Espionage Laws and Leaks: Hearings Before the Subcomm on Legislation of
the House Permanent Select Comm on Intelligence, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1979) (testi-
mony of Daniel B. Silver, General Counsel, National Security Agency) [hereinafter cited
as Espionage Laws and Leaks].
23. M. HALPERIN, J. BERMAN, R. BOROSAGE & C. MARWICK, THE LAWLESS STATE
172 (1976).
24. SENATE SELECT Comm. TO STUDY GOvERNmENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE AcTrvmEs, FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, FINAL REPORT,
BOOK 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 333-34 (1975).
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secret presidential memorandum established the Agency in 1952.25
Although the NSA remains cloaked in secrecy, its cryptologic serv-
ices have been of enormous value to the United States. For example,
an NSA predecessor deciphered Japanese correspondences that fore-
warned of the bombing of Pearl Harbor.26 Another NSA predecessor
in United States Army intelligence deciphered a Japanese code dur-
ing World War II that gave the United States Pacific Fleet an invalu-
able strategic advantage culminating in American victories in the
Corhl Sea and at Midway.27 Further, the NSA first alerted the
nation to Soviet efforts to install offensive missiles in Cuba in the
early 1960's.28 And in 1972, during the Strategic Arms Limitations
Talks, the NSA intercepted and deciphered confidential Soviet nego-
tiating positions. The information allowed United States diplomats
to win a bilateral agreement not to build anti-ballistic missile sys-
tems.29 It is, therefore, not surprising that Senator Walter Mondale
said that he "consider[ed]. . .[the NSA]. . .to be possibly the sin-
gle most important source of intelligence for this nation.' ' 30 Indeed,
history attests that when NSA methods and secrets are compromised
or disclosed, potentially serious consequences to national security
may result.31
The NSA is worried by the growth of the public cryptography
industry, viewing it as a threat to the NSA's mission.32 The Agency
is concerned that a rapid growth in private cryptology research could
significantly undermine its domination of the science.33 Moreover,
the private development and dissemination of algorithms used in
public cryptography could alert a foreign nation, whose communica-
25. See House REPORT, SUpra note 17, at 63.
26. See BAMFORD, supra note 8, at 35-39. By the time the messages came through
communication channels to military commanders, it was too late to prevent the catastro-
phe that occurred.
27. Id at 43.
28. Id at 215.
29. See Kahn, supra note 9, at 21 (Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missle
Systems, United States - Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S.
No. 7503 (1972)).
30. Kahn, supra note 9, at 21 (quoting Sen. Walter Mondale).
31. For example, in 1960 two high level NSA cryptologists defected to the Soviet
Union. A Department of Defense official is reported to have called the defection "possi-
bly the worst security breach since Klaus Fuchs gave the Russians the secret of the atom
bomb." BAMFORD, supra note 8, at 143. President Eisenhower labelled the pair "self-
confessed traitors." Raymond, President Calls Pair Traitorous, N.Y. Times, Sept. 7, 1960,
at 11, col. 1. President Truman concluded: "They ought to be shot .... " Truman
Agrees to Stump State, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1960, at 44, col. 1.
32. House Hearings, supra note 6, at 424 (testimony of Adm. B.R. Inman, Director,
National Security Agency); see also Broad, Computer Security Worries Military Experts,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1983, at 2, col. 2.
33. Address by Adm. B.R. Inman to the Armed Services Communications and Elec-
tronics Association (Mar. 1979), The NSA Perspective on Telecommunications Protection
in the Nongovernmental Sector, reprinted in CRYPTOLOGIA 129, 130 (July 1979).
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tions the NSA now monitors and deciphers, to flaws in that nation's
coding system, thereby inducing it to change its codes.34 Finally, the
NSA fears that public cryptography could threaten the security of
sensitive U. S. Government information by divulging weaknesses in
federal code systems or rapidly advancing other nations' abilities to
decipher federal codes. 35
C. THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY'S ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL
FEDERAL FUNDING FOR AND PUBLICATION OF PUBLIC
CRYPTOGRAPHY RESEARCH
NSA concern with public cryptography became evident in 1975
when the Agency tried to stop all National Science Foundation
(NSF) grants for cryptology research.36 The NSA asserted that it
had exclusive authority to fund cryptology research, and accordingly
that NSF grants for cryptology research were illegal.37 Although the
NSF did rebuke the NSA, the two agencies subsequently have
agreed on coordinated funding and review procedures under which
the NSA reviews NSF cryptology research grant applications to
determine whether the proposed research presents any threats to
national security.38 Thus, the NSA has acquired control of NSF
34. Id at 130-32.
35. Id An unspoken concern of the NSA is that private individuals and companies
may develop and begin to employ codes so secure that even the NSA can not decipher
them. This is allegedly one reason why the NSA became involved in the National
Bureau of Standards' contract with IBM to develop an encryption system for private and
government records, known as the Data Encryption Standard. "[S]ome critics suspect
that this coding system was carefully designed to be just secure enough so that corporate
spies outside the government could not break a user's code and just vulnerable enough so
that the National Security Agency could break it." Kolata, Computer Encryption and the
National Security Connection, SCIENCE, July 29, 1977, at 438. It is feasible that the pri-
vate sector will develop unbreakable codes. "At the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy, . . . [cryptologists have] ... proposed a system employing the 'public key'
approach. Known as the R.S.A. system, it is widely regarded as unbreakable, given pres-
ent computer capabilities." Sullivan, Tighter Security Rulesfor Advances in Cryptology,
N.Y. Times, June 1, 1981, at 17, col. 3. But cf Faffick, supra note 14 (description of how
one "public key" code was broken).
36. See Memorandum from F. Weingarten, National Science Foundation, to Gen-
eral Counsel, National Science Foundation (June 13, 1975), reprinted in House Hearings,
supra note 6, at 762. During this same period the NSA also unsuccessfully attempted to
have the United States Patent Office place secrecy orders on patent requests for encryp-
tion devices. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 21-24. That NSA effort may have been
authorized by the Inventions Secrecy Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
The possible use of the Inventions Secrecy Act to control public dissemination and mar-
keting of cryptologic devices for which patents have been requested is beyond the scope
of this Note. For a description of the Act and its possible application to public cryptogra-
phy research, see HousE REPORT, supra note 17, at 161.
37. Memorandum from J. Lasken, Assistant to the General Counsel, National Sci-
ence Foundation, to F. Weingarten, National Science Foundation (June 19, 1975),
reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 6, at 763.
38. File Memorandum from F. Weingarten, National Science Foundation (May 3,
1977), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 6, at 764-65; Letter from J. Pasta, National
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funding of cryptology research at American academic institutions
and elsewhere.
The public first became aware of the NSA's fears of privately
funded cryptology research in 1977 when an NSA employee wrote a
letter to the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE)3 9 warning that a scheduled conference at Cornell University
might violate the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR).4° The letter advised the IEEE that the symposium's ses-
sions on cryptography could subject participants to severe criminal
sanctions if the IEEE did not acquire licenses from the State Depart-
ment prior to the symposium. 41 Although the letter apparently
lacked formal NSA authorization,42 it sent a chill through the con-
ference.43 Since this incident, the use of the ITAR as a prepublica-
tion restraint on public cryptography has been found to be an
unconstitutional prior restraint of speech in an internal, nonbind-
ing" Justice Department memorandum, 45 and has been the subject
of congressional hearings.46
Science Foundation, to C. Corry, National Security Agency (Nov. 28, 1977), reprinted in
id at 768; Letter from R. Atkinson, National Science Foundation, to Adm. B. R. Inman,
National Security Agency (Sept. 7, 1978), reprinted in id at 770-7 1; Letter from Adm.
B.R. Inman, National Security Agency, to R. Atkinson, National Science Foundation
(Sept. 21, 1978), reprinted in id. at 772; Letter from R. Atkinson, National Science Foun-
dation, to Adm. B. R. Inman, National Security Agency (Dec. 27, 1978), reprintedin id at
773.
39. See House Hearings, supra note 6, at 426-27 (statement of Rep. Richardson
Preyer).
40. 22 C.F.R. §§ 121-30 (1983). For a discussion of the ITAR, see infra notes 86-111
and accompanying text.
41. House Hearings, supra note 6, at 426-27 (statement of Rep. Richardson Preyer).
42. Id at 427 (testimony of Adm. B.R. Inman, Director, National Security Agency).
43. Kahn, supra note 9, at 24. A Stanford University graduate student was informed
by Stanford's lawyers that Stanford might be unwilling to incur the legal costs which
could arise from prosecution under the ITAR, as it would were a member of Stanford's
faculty prosecuted. Consequently, the student's paper was presented by the student's
faculty advisor. Letter from Professor Toby Berger, Cornell University, to Ken Pierce
(Apr. 28, 1984) (letter on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal).
44. See House Hearings, supra note 6, at 266-67 (testimony of H. Miles Foy, Office of
Legal Counsel, Department of Justice).
45. Memorandum from J. Harmon, Department of Justice, to F. Press, Science Advi-
sor to the President (May 11, 1978), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 6, at 268-84.
"[1]t is our view that the existing provisions of the ITAR are unconstitutional insofar as
they establish a prior restraint on disclosure of cryptographic ideas and information
developed by scientists and mathematicians in the private sector." Id at 284.
46. See generally House Hearings, supra note 6.
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D. THE PUBLIC CRYPTOGRAPHY STUDY GROUP'S VOLUNTARY
SYSTEM OF PREPUBLICATION REVIEW OF PUBLIC
CRYPTOGRAPHY RESEARCH HAS FAILED
The letter to the IEEE and the public's growing awareness of
NSA involvement in NSF cryptology grant proposals and private
patent applications 47 drew criticism from the academic community. 48
In response to that criticism, Robert Inman, then director of the
NSA, publicly outlined the Agency's concerns with public cryptogra-
phy.49 Acting on a request from Inman, the American Council on
Education convened the Public Cryptography Study Group.50 The
goals of the Study Group arguably presented an insolvable dilemma.
The Group was to recommend a procedure under which academic
freedom to pursue public cryptography research would be protected
but simultaneously would be controlled in such a way as to pose a
minimal threat to the NSA's mission and national security.51 During
the Study Group's meetings the NSA made the Group aware of the
Agency's position that the ITAR authorizes a prior restraint on pub-
lic cryptography publications,52 of the Justice Department's memo-
randum 53 questioning the constitutionality of this application of the
ITAR,54 of the NSA's desire for a uniform system of prepublication
review, 55 and of the NSA's general legislative proposal to replace the
ITAR.5 6
47. See HousE REPORT, supra note 17, at 21-26.
48. See, e.g., House Hearings, supra note 6, at 416-23 (testimony of George Davida,
Associate Professor, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Uni-
versity of Wisconsin-Milwaukee); id at 406-16 (testimony of David Kahn, author and
past president of the New York Cipher Society and of the American Cryptogram Associ-
ation); Ferguson, Scient#fc Freedom, National Security, and the First Amendment, ScI-
ENCE 620-24 (Aug. 12, 1983).
49. See Address by Adm. B.R. Inman, supra note 33.
50. See American Council on Education, Public Cryptography Study Group---A
Report to the Society, NoTicEs OF THE AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL SOCIETY 518 (Oct.
1981) [hereinafter cited as American Council on Education].
51. Id. at 517-18.
52. See Memorandum from D. Schwartz, General Counsel, National Security
Agency, to the Public Cryptography Study Group (May 6, 1980), reprinted in House
Hearings, supra note 6, at 707. Attached to the memorandum was a copy of the Address
by Adm. B.R. Inman, supra note 33. In the address Inman stated: "The Agency has also
recognized that ambiguities in the definitional provisions of the ITAR could be viewed as
inhibiting international scholarly exchanges on matters relating to cryptology. Another
ambiguity in the regulation could be viewed as imposing a requirement of prior govern-
mental review on domestic scholarly publications."
53. See Memorandum from J. Harmon, supra note 45.
54. See American Council on Education, supra note 50, at 520.
55. See Minutes of the Second Meeting of the Public Cryptography Study Group
(May 29, 1980), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 6, at 702.
56. The NSA recommended a system of restrictions based on either prepublication
review, presumably by the NSA, or postpublication criminal sanctions. Either system
would have applied to an undefined core of cryptologic information. The amount of
information actually affected would have been quite large, as both proposals provided
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The Study Group rejected both the use of the ITAR to control
public cryptography research and the NSA legislative proposal.57 It
settled58 instead on a voluntary system59 of prior review under which
the NSA could recommend changes in a monograph before publica-
tion.60 Many cryptology researchers, however, are dissatisfied with
the Study Group's proposal.61 They believe that the proposal consti-
tutes an infringement on academic freedom, and they are concerned
by the NSA's authority under the proposal to censor their work. To
date, the Study Group's proposal has been "all but officially
ignored" 62 by those whom the Study Group hoped would
participate.
The NSA tentatively accepted the Study Group's voluntary sys-
for the restraint of publications "likely to have a discernible adverse impact on the
national security." Although the proposals alluded to some type of "judicial review,"
publication of an article on public cryptography without first obtaining a license from the
NSA would be a crime under both proposals. See American Council on Education,
supra note 50, at 520-21. In testimony to Congress, Inman reiterated the NSA's desire
for prepublication review of public cryptography publications. House Hearings, supra
note 6, at 427 (testimony of Adm. B.R. Inman, Director, National Security Agency).
57. American Council on Education, supra note 50, at 522-23.
58. The Study Group's report was not unanimous; it included a dissent against any
form of government review of academic research. See Davida, The Case Against
Restraints on Non-governmental Research in Cryptography, reprinted in American Council
on Education, supra note 50, at 524-26.
59. Voluntary censorship systems have been established in the past with mixed
results. During World War I the federal government established a voluntary press cen-
sorship system to control the dissemination of information detrimental to the war effort.
The government asked reporters to adhere to the self-censorship regulations issued by
the Departments of State, War, and Navy. The program largely was ineffective because
the censored information appeared in publications other than those participating in the
program. Another unsuccessful system was the Office of Strategic Information, estab-
lished in 1954 by the Commerce Department, which set up a voluntary system to stop
United States businessmen from sending unclassified strategic data to foreign nations.
That program was not well received and largely was ineffective. In contrast, when the
Office of Censorship, established in 1941, issued a narrow Code of Wartime Practices
and identified types of military information which might be helpful to the enemy, volun-
tary compliance was generally good. See J. WIGGINS, FREEDOM OR SECRECY 95-104
(1956). See also Espionage Laws and Leaks, supra note 22, at 44-45 (testimony of Robert
Keuch, Deputy Asst. Attorney General, Department of Justice) ("I know of a number of
cases... [of government sponsored voluntary censorship systems]... and we have had
a mixed result." Id at 45).
60. American Council on Education, supra note 50, at 523-24.
61. See Davida, supra note 58; Burnham, Government Restricting Flow of Information
to the Public, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1982, § A, at 1, col. 4 (subcommittee of the American
Association of University Professors lodged a protest against these and other governmen-
tal actions that the subcommittee viewed as serious infringements on academic freedom);
Handelman, supra note 5, at 5, col. 1 (scientist doing cryptography research turned down
a National Science Foundation grant because he feared NSA control of his funding and
research).
62. BAMFORD, supra note 8, at 363.
CRYPTOGRA4PHYAND EXPORT CONTROLS
tern and outlined procedures for its operation. 63 But the NSA is not
bound by the Study Group's proposal. Faced with the widespread
noncooperation with the voluntary system, the Agency has
threatened to enforce restrictive laws that would establish an effec-
tive system of prepublication review of public cryptography
research.64 Given the past actions of the federal government and
recent events, 65 these restrictive laws are most likely to be the ITAR.
II
PREPUBLICATION CONTROL OF PUBLIC
CRYPTOGRAPHY RESEARCH BY ENFORCEMENT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS
REGULATIONS
One goal of the National Security Agency is to establish uni-
form prepublication review of public cryptography research.66 The
Study Group's voluntary censorship proposal can not guarantee
such review. Similarly, post publication criminal sanctions under
the Espionage and Censorship Statutes, 67 which provide penalties
for the intentional disclosure of classified information,68 also fail to
meet NSA concerns. While the espionage statute specifically related
to the disclosure of federal cryptology systems 69 "makes prosecution
easier than any of the other espionage laws,"70 it only applies to clas-
63. Letter from L. Fauren, Director, National Security Agency, to W. LeVegue,
Executive Director, American Mathematical Society (Apr. 22, 1982), reprinted in
NOTICES OF AMERICAN MATHEMATICAL SOCIETY 322-23 (June 1982).
64. See BAMFORD, supra note 8, at 363.
65. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. See also Greenberg, Remote Censor-
ing" DOD Blocks Symposium Papers, SCIENCE NEws 148 (Sept. 4, 1982) (Departments
of State, Commerce, and Defense used threat of the ITAR sanctions to force the removal
of over one hundred unclassified papers from an August 1982 international symposium
on optical engineering in San Diego); Wade, Science Meetings Catch the U.S. - Soviet
Chill, SCIENCE 1056 (Mar. 7, 1980) (threats of the ITAR sanctions used to disinvite
Soviet scientists from the American Vacuum Society's February 1980 conference on bub-
ble memory); Note, Aims Control - State Department Regulation of Exports of Technical
Data Relating to Munitions Held to Encompass General Knowledge and Experience, 9
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 91, 101 (1976) (acting under the ITAR, State Department
refused to issue licenses to a group of American Scientists preparing to address a confer-
ence on space technology in Madrid, thus preventing the scientists from delivering papers
on rocket propulsion and reentry problems of space vehicles); see generally Abrams,
supra note 1.
66. See Address by Adm. B.R. Inman, supra note 33, at 134-35; Shapley, Intelligence
Agency Chief Seeks "Dialogue" with Academics, SCIENCE 407 (Oct. 27, 1978).
67. 18 U.S.C. §§ 791-99 (1982).
68. See Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1941) (holding that scienter is required
for conviction under the Espionage and Censorship Statutes).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 798(a) (1982).
70. Espionage Laws and Leaks, supra note 22, at 26 (testimony of Daniel B. Silver,
General Counsel, National Security Agency).
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sifted information and may not be invoked until after publication. 71
Unfortunately, once the key to a code is published, damage to
national security is complete. Moreover, the criminal trial necessary
to the statute's enforcement may expose information even more
harmful to national security than the published disclosure.72 Gener-
ally, the Executive constitutionally is constrained from placing prior
restraints on private publications 73 absent congressional authoriza-
tion74 or an employment or contract relationship between the author
and the federal government. 75
To prevent potential harm to national security, the State
Department placed public cryptography publications under the
ITAR licensing system.76 These regulations establish a system of
prior restraint on public cryptography research.77 They are, how-
ever, based on questionable legislative authority.78
71. 18 U.S.C. § 798(a) (1982).
72. This sometimes is referred to as the "greymail" problem. See generally HOUSE
COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT HANDLING OF CASES
INVOLVING CLASSIFIED DATA AND CLAIMS OF NATIONAL SEcURTY, H.R. REP. No. 280,
96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
73. See infra notes 122-29 and accompanying text. For a discussion of a judicially
developed exception to this principle, the national security exception, see infra notes 146-
65 and accompanying text.
74. For a discussion of this doctrine and the lack of congressional authorization of
the ITAR, see infra notes 217-53 and accompanying text. Congress has authorized prior
restraints by the Executive in only a few narrow instances, most notably the publication
of information for the development of atomic weapons. The Atomic Energy Act places a
government security classification on private atomic weapons research. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2161-66 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). This statute embodies the notion of "born classified"
wherein all information of this nature is subject to a blanket prior restraint. See gener-
ally, HousE REPORT, supra note 17, at 132-42. Use of the Act to restrain a private publi-
cation regarding atomic weapons designs was upheld by a federal district court over a
first amendment challenge. United States v. The Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990
(W.D. Wisc. 1979), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979). The restraining order
was lifted, at the government's request, when the case was rendered moot by public dis-
semination of the information by another source. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at 145-
46. The Inventions Secrecy Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (1976 & Supp. V 1981), allows the
government to classify and take certain private inventions upon receipt of a patent appli-
cation. The Act provides compensation for the applicant's loss of the use of his inven-
tion. This statute has not been challenged in court on first amendment grounds. See
supra note 36.
75. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (granting Executive request
for a court order to stop publication of a book about public and unclassified activities of
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) written by a former CIA employee, based upon
contractual and employment duties of the author to his former government employer).
These employment and contractual justifications for a prior restraint are inapplicable to
public cryptography, which is, by definition, limited to the use and development of codes
by private persons independent of the government. See supra note 5.
76. See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
77. See infra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 227-53 and accompanying text. Another statute, the Export
Administration Act (EAA), 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-20 (Supp. V 1981), and the regula-
tions promulgated thereunder, 15 C.F.R. §§ 368-99 (1983), may operate as a prior
restraint system similar to the ITAR. But the EAA's regulations defer control of the
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A. HISTORY, OPERATION, AND APPLICATION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS
The commerce clause of the Constitution delegates to Congress
the power to control United States exports.7 9 In an exercise of this
power, Congress enacted the Mutual Security Act of 1954.80 Section
414 of the Act provided the President with broad authority8' to con-
trol "the export of. . . arms, ammunition and implements of war,
including technical data related thereto" in the interest of national
security.82 The ITAR originally was promulgated by the Depart-
ment of State based upon this statutory language.8 3 The Arms
Export Control Act of 197684 subsequently replaced section 414 of
the 1954 Act, and the State Department currently views it as legisla-
export of information and items related to cryptology to the ITAR. See 15 C.F.R.
§ 370.10(a) (1983). See also 50 U.S.C. § 2416(b) (Supp. V 1981). Although beyond the
scope of this Note, the constitutionality of prior restraints under the EAA may be
assessed according to the legal principles and doctrines discussed herein.
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations .... "). In a case involving a suit by the United States
for contract damages and other relief against a private importer of seed potatoes in viola-
tion of an Executive agreement but consistent with statutory controls, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held:
[Wihile the President has certain inherent powers under the Constitution such as
the power pertaining to his position as Commander in Chief of Army and Navy
and the power necessary to see that the laws are faithfully executed, the power to
regulate... foreign commerce is not among the powers incident to the Presi-
dential office, but is expressly vested by the Constitution in the Congress.
United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc. 204 F.2d 655, 659 (4th Cir. 1953), afid on other
grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955). The Supreme Court did not address this separation of
powers issue in its opinion. Indeed, the Court still has not ruled on the precise demarca-
tion between presidential power to control the export of arms, arguably an inherent
aspect of Executive foreign policy powers, and the express power of Congress to regulate
foreign commerce. For a criticism of the Capps decision, see L. HENIIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 180-87 (1972). But cf L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 171 (1978).
80. Mutual Security Act, ch. 937, 68 Stat. 832 (1954), repealed by Arms Export Con-
trol Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, § 212 (b)(1), 90 Stat. 745 (1976), codified at 22
U.S.C. § 2778 (1982).
81. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Act was
not an unconstitutional delegation of power from the Congress to the Executive. Samora
v. United States, 406 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1969).
82. Mutual Security Act of 1954, ch. 937, § 414(a), 68 Stat. 832, 948 (1954), repealed
by Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, § 212 (b)(1), 90 Stat. 745
(1976), codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1982). The House version of the bill did not contain
the reference to related technical data. The conference committee accepted the Senate
language. See CoNi. REP. No. 2637, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 414, reprinted in 1954 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3338, 3347. ("It is believed that control over technical data,
although difficult to administer except when wartime censorship is in effect, is important
to United States security and that those responsible for controlling the export and import
of munitions should be given such authority.") See also Note supra note 65, at 96-98.
83. See 22 C.F.R. Part 121 (1983) (authority section).
84. Pub. L. No. 94-329, § 212 (b)(1), 90 Stat. 745 (1976), codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2778
(1982).
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tive authority for the ITAR.8 5
The ITAR requires that articles designated by the President as
"arms, ammunition, and implements of war"8 6 be placed on the
United States Munitions List and that their export be licensed by the
Department of State.87 A willful violation of this licensing system is
punishable by a fine of up to $100,000, imprisonment up to two
years, or both.88 The Munitions List includes cryptographic
devices,89 as well as classified 9o and unclassified 9 technical data92
related to cryptographic devices. The definition of "technical data"
given by the Department of State is so broad, however, that it is
difficult to determine what the term does not cover.93 Technical data
subject to the ITAR include:
85. See 22 C.F.R. Part 121 (1983) (authority section). See also Arms Export Control
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-329, § 212 (b)(1), 90 Stat. 745 (1976), codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 2778 (1982). ("Any reference to [section 1934 of this title] shall be deemed to be a
reference to section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act [this section] and any reference to
licenses issued under section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act [this section] shall be
deemed to include a reference to licenses issued under section 414 of the Mutual Security
Act of 1954.") The ITAR was not amended significantly when its legislative authority
shifted from the 1954 Act to the 1976 Act. The 1976 Act gives the President authority to
control munitions exports in the interests of "world peace and the security and foreign
policy of the United States." 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (1982). The 1976 Act substitutes
"defense articles and defense services," 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (1982), for the 1954 Act's
phrase "arms, ammunition and implements of war, including technical data related
thereto." 68 Stat. 848(a), ch. 937, § 414(a), repealedby Arms Export Control Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-329, § 212 (b)(1), 90 Stat. 745 (1976), codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1982).
Unfortunately, the legislative history of the 1976 Act offers no explanation why Congress
did not retain the "technical data related thereto" language of the 1954 Act. H.R. R.EP.
No. 94-1144, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), S. REP. No. 94-876, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976),
CoNF. REP. No. 94-1272, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 1378-1454. Presidential authority under the 1976 Act is delegated to the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. Exec. Order No. 11,958, 3 C.F.R. § 79
(1978).
86. 22 C.F.R. § 121.01 (1983). Although the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 sub-
stituted "defense articles and defense services" for the terms "arms, ammunition and
implements of war" of the Mutual Security Act of 1954, see supra note 85, the ITAR
retains the terminology of the earlier Act.
87. 22 C.F.R. § 123.01 (1983).
88. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (1982).
89. 22 C.F.R. § 121.01, Category XIII(b) (1983) ("Speech scramblers, privacy
devices, cryptographic devices (encoding and decoding), and specifically designed com-
ponents therefore, ancillary equipment, and especially devised protective apparatus for
such devices, components, and equipment").
90. 22 C.F.R. § 121.01, Category XVII (1983).
91. 22 C.F.R. § 125.04(a) (1983).
92. 22 C.F.R. § 121.01, Category XVIII (1983).
93. See United States v. Edler Industries, Inc., 579 F.2d 516, 519 (9th Cir. 1978)
(upholding conviction under the ITAR for the unlicensed export of missile technology to
a French company over a first amendment overbreadth challenge): "The basic principles
of the diesel engine, for example, constitute unclassified information that can be used in
the manufacture of military trucks, which are included in category VII(d) of the U.S.
Munitions List." (citing 22 C.F.R § 121.01 (1977)).
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(a) Any unclassified information that can be used, or be adapted for use, in
the design, production, manufacture, repair, overhaul, processing, engineer-
ing, development, operation, maintenance, or reconstruction of arms, ammu-
nition, and implements of war on the U.S. Munitions List; or
(b) any technology which advances the state-of-the-art or establishes a new
art in an area of significant military applicability in the United States.94
The definition of the term "export" adopted by the Department of
State for purposes of the ITAR also is ambiguous. Under the ITAR
an export of technical data takes place:
whenever the information is to be exported by oral, visual, or documentary
means. Therefore, an export occurs whenever technical data is, inter alia,
mailed or shipped outside the United States, carried by hand outside the
United States, disclosed through visits abroad by American citizens (includ-
ing participation in briefings and symposia) and disclosed to foreign nation-
als in the United States (including plant visits and participation in briefings
and symposia).95
The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 gives the President96
broad discretion to control arms exports, 9 7 and the Department of
State makes full use of this discretion in defining the applicability of
the ITAR licensing system9 8 and its criminal penalties.99 The ITAR
does exempt certain unclassified technical data from its licensing
requirements. 100 The exemption basically is limited to information
already published and widely available in the public domain. 10 1 This
94. 22 C.F.R. § 125.01 (1983).
95. 22 C.F.R. § 125.03 (1983).
96. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (1982). The President has delegated his authority to the
Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. Exec. Order No. 11,958, 3 C.F.R. 79
(1978). The ITAR licensing system is administered by the Secretary of State. 22 C.F.R.
§ 121.21 (1983).
97. In furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United
States, the President is authorized to control the import and the export of defense articles
and defense services and to provide foreign policy guidance to persons of the United
States involved in the export and import of such articles and services." 22 U.S.C.
§ 2778(a)(1) (1982).
98. The Department of State concludes that it can deny, revoke, or suspend an ITAR
license without prior notice whenever it believes such action to be advisable "in further-
ance of (1) World peace; (2) The security of the United States; (3) The foreign policy of
the United States; or (4) Whenever the Department believes that [the Arms Export Con-
trol Act of 1976 or the ITAR has] been violated." 22 C.F.R. § 123.05 (1983).
99. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (1982). See supra text accompanying note 88.
100. 22 C.F.RL § 125.11 (1983).
101. The ITAR exempts unclassified technical data if it:
(1) . . .is in published form and subject to public dissemination by being:
(i) Sold at newsstands and bookstores;
(ii) Available by subscription or purchase without restrictions to any per-
son or available without cost to any person;
(iii) Granted second class mailing privileges by the U.S. Government; or
(iv) Freely available at public libraries.
Id See United States v. Van Hee, 531 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1976) (upholding conviction for
conspiracy to violate the ITAR and holding that a defendant's technological expertise
was a type of technical data covered by the ITAR): "The exemption obviously refers
only to unclassified technical data in published form." Id at 357 (emphasis in opinion).
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exemption, however, is not self-executing; it must be applied for. 0 2
Upon an adverse decision by the Department of State concerning an
ITAR license or an exemption, an applicant may obtain a review of
his case within the Department.10 3 This internal review is final and
there is no requirement that the Department secure a court order
before prohibiting the export of information subject to the ITAR.1°4
Public cryptography research publications are not mentioned in
the Mutual Security Act of 1954 or the Arms Export Control Act of
1976 or their legislative histories. 05 But the broad, indeterminate
definitions of the ITAR and the wide discretion of the Department
of State thereunder bring these publications within the ITAR com-
pass. The Department of Justice and the National Security Agency
have reached this same conclusion. 0 6 The ITAR definitions require
that the domestic publication of public cryptography research papers
be licensed'0 7 by the Department of State if the publication is
intended for export or made available to foreign nationals in the
United States. 08 To obtain a license, a researcher must submit his
monograph to the State Department for prior review and possible
censorship. 10 9 Failure to seek a license before publication or publi-
cation after a license has been denied subjects a researcher to severe
criminal sanctions. 10 Moreover, the Department of State need not
102. 22 C.F.R. § 125.20(a) (1983). The burden of obtaining government approval of
an ITAR license or of an ITAR exemption is on the person or company seeking publica-
tion. 22 C.F.R. § 125.11(a)(l) n.3 (1983).
103. 22 C.F.R. § 123.05(c) (1983); 22 C.F.R. Part 128 (1983).
104. The ITAR licensing procedures are not subject to the rulemaking and adjudica-
tory provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-54 (1982). 22
C.F.R. § 128.01 (1983). However, a person whose export is subject to the ITAR possibly
may initiate judicial review of a license denial after the export is restrained. 5 U.S.C.
§§ 701-06 (1982) (judicial review). And judicial review is available for a person con-
victed of an ITAR violation. See, e.g., Van Hee, 531 F.2d 352; Edler, 579 F.2d 516;
United States v. Donas-Botto, 363 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
105. For the relevant legislative histories of the two acts, see H.R. REP. No. 1925, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), S. REP. No. 1799, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), CONF. REP. No.
2637, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 3175-
3352; H.R. REP. No. 94-1144, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), S. REp. No. 94-876, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), CONF. REP. No. 94-1272, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprintedin
1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1378-1454.
106. See Memorandum from J. Harmon, supra note 45; House Hearings, supra note 6,
at 253 (testimony of H. Miles Foy, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice);
Address by Adm. B.R. Inman, supra note 33, at 133.
107. Public cryptography research is unclassified technical data that can be used "in
the design, production, manufacture, repair, overhaul, processing, engineering, develop-
ment, operation, maintenance, or reconstruction. . .," 22 C.F.R. § 125.01 (1983), of a
cryptologic device, an item on the U.S. Munitions List. 22 C.F.R. § 121.01, Category
XIII(b) (1983). Publication of public cryptography research, therefore, is subject to the
ITAR licensing system.
108. 22 C.F.R. § 125.03 (1983).
109. 22 C.F.R. § 125.20(a) (1983).
110. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (1982). See supra text accompanying note 88.
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obtain a court determination before taking action under the
ITAR."' The ITAR thus provides an Executive agency with a sys-
tem of prior restraints over private publications in the science of
cryptology.
III
THE INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS
REGULATIONS' PREPUBLICATION REVIEW OF PUBLIC
CRYPTOGRAPHY RESEARCH HAS INSUFFICIENT
PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS TO BE A VALID PRIOR
RESTRAINT OF SPEECH
Publications in public cryptography are a form of speech pro-
tected by the first amendment.1 2 A prior restraint of protected
111. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
112. Different types of speech, speech uttered under different circumstances, enjoy
varying levels of constitutional protection. Traditionally, the expression of political
opinions and commentary on government are most protected by the first amendment.
See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978) (overturning
conviction for publication of news accounts of state judiciary oversight commission). See
also infra note 129 and accompanying text. The Court has delineated some forms of
speech to which the first amendment offers only limited protection. See, e.g., Brown v.
Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1979) (upholding prior restraint of soldier's petition on a military
base); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1975) (limiting civilian's free speech on a military
base); Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen's Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976) (establishing lower first amendment protections for commercial
speech); C.S.C. v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (upholding restrictions on political
speech by government employees); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (lowering
first amendment protections for obscene words); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942) ("fighting words" not protected by the first amendment). Although the
Supreme Court never has ruled directly on the applicability of the first amendment to
scientific publications like those in public cryptography, it has stated that "It]he First
Amendment protects works which, taken as a whole, have serious literary, artistic, polit-
ical, or scientific value . . . ." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973) (dictum)
(upholding conviction for the mailing of unsolicited obscene materials). Publications in
public cryptography are scientific endeavors that fall squarely within the parameters of
the Miller articulation of the first amendment's scope. Moreover, because writings in
public cryptography generally are of academic origin and nature, their first amendment
protections are doubly ensured. Cf. University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265, 312 (1978) ("Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional
right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment.") (opinion by
Powell, J.); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) ("The vigilant protection of con-
stitutional freedoms is no where more vital than in the community of American
schools."); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,. 250 (1956) ("The essentiality of
freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-evident.") (opinion by
Warren, CJ.); Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1275 (7th Cir. 1982)
("[W]hatever constitutional protection is afforded by the First Amendment extends as
readily to the scholar in the laboratory as to the teacher in the classroom.").
The Court sometimes has employed a distinction in first amendment protections
between speech and conduct. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (Cox II).
Professor Tribe says of this approach that, "[w]hile it would probably be better to bury
this distinction entirely, it is likely to remain in the vocabulary of the Court and can do
little harm if it is recognized that the words cannot and do not stand for a distinctive
approach to the resolution of first amendment issues." L. TmBE, supra note 79, at 601.
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speech is not "unconstitutionalper se." 3 Prior restraints of pro-
tected speech, however, "are the most serious and the least tolerable
infringement on first amendment rights."114 Because the ITAR
licensing system is a prior restraint of publications in cryptogra-
phy,1 1the ITAR's constitutionality must be assessed by referring to
first amendment principles. These principles require that prior
restraints provide certain procedural safeguards to be constitu-
tional." 6 Of particular relevance" 7 is the requirement of a judicial
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied a speech-conduct distinction to
uphold the ITAR against a first amendment challenge. United States v. Edler Industries,
Inc. 579 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1976). Defendants were convicted for exporting missile
and rocket technology to a French corporation after having been denied an ITAR license
for the export. The court held that the ITAR "control[s] the conduct of assisting foreign
enterprises to obtain military equipment and related technical expertise." 579 F.2d at
521. The court's attempt to segregate proscribed conduct from protected speech under
the ITAR is not convincing. It fails for the same reason that undermines any use of this
analytical dichotomy: all speech involves some conduct. The dichotomy offers no pre-
dictability for future cases; it amounts to no more than ad hoc rationalization. Thus
Edler provides no clues to a structured reasoning that could lift public cryptography
publications from the first amendment protections they enjoy. The Department of Jus-
tice has reached a similar conclusion: "[W]hile the Ninth Circuit's decision is helpful in
resolving First Amendment issues with respect to blueprints and similar types of techni-
cal data used as a basis for producing military equipment, we do not believe that it either
resolves the First Amendment issues presented by restrictions on export of cryptographic
ideas or eliminates the need to reexamine the ITAR." Letter from L. Hammond, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, to W. Kay, Office of Science and
Technology Policy (August 29, 1978), reprinted in House Hearings, supra note 6, at 264-
65.
113. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975) (invalidating
prior restraint on the performance of the musical production "Hair").
114. Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (overturning prior
restraint of the press imposed to protect a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial).
115. See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
117. Another first amendment principle applicable in the context of the ITAR's prior
restraint of public cryptography research is the overbreadth doctrine. The due process
doctrine of void-for-vagueness also is relevant. Because, however, the ITAR is constitu-
tionally infirm for the procedural deficiency of a lack of judicial review before a prior
restraint is imposed, see infra notes 130-37 and accompanying text, analysis of the over-
breadth and void-for-vagueness objections is beyond the scope of this Note. A general,
preliminary discussion of these issues, however, is appropriate.
Federal control over foreign commerce is constitutional and limitations on the export
of arms fall within the permissible boundaries of this power. See United States v. Gur-
rola-Garcia, 547 F.2d 1075 (9th Cir. 1976) (affirming conviction for violation of arms
export regulations over a challenge that the authorizing statute was an unconstitutional
delegation of power). Nevertheless, "a governmental purpose to control or prevent activ-
ities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."
NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964) (holding unconstitutional Alabama's
demand that the NAACP reveal the names and addresses of all its agents and members
in the state). Legislation that serves a valid government interest but proscribes activities
protected by the first amendment may be held unconstitutional under the overbreadth
doctrine. See general Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L.
REv. 844 (1970). A statute that is overbroad, however, might be upheld if an authorita-
tive judicial interpretation of the statute limits its coverage to activities that the govern-
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ment constitutionally may regulate. See, e.g., Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569
(1941) (Cox 1) (upholding state statute that required a license for a "parade or proces-
sion" on a public street in light of state supreme court's interpretive narrowing of the
statute's scope and application). Cf. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969)
(striking down a narrow interpretation of a parade licensing statute by a state supreme
court that was issued four years after defendant was arrested for violation of the statute).
The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 and the ITAR achieve the valid governmental
interest of controlling arms exports, but the prior restraints that they impose on public
cryptography publications impinge on first amendment liberties and thus could subject
the licensing system to an overbreadth challenge. See Memorandum from J. Harmon,
supra note 45, at 283-84. In United States v. Donas-Botto, 363 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Mich.
1973), defendants were indicted for conspiracy to export an armored car to Portugal
without an ITAR license. Defendants were charged with supervising the dismantling of
the vehicle in Portugal to facilitate a process known as reverse engineering. These latter
acts were charged to be in violation of the ITAR as unlicensed exports of technical
knowledge. Defendants made an overbreadth challenge, claiming that the application of
the regulations to technical knowledge, as opposed to the export of goods, violated the
first amendment. The district court denied a motion to dismiss, holding: "[A]lthough
First Amendment rights are to be closely guarded, when matters of foreign policy are
involved the government has the constitutional authority to prohibit individuals from
divulging 'technical data' related to implements of war to foreign governments." Id at
194. The court apparently found the defendants' activities not protected by the first
amendment in the presence of a congressional intent to place technical knowledge within
the statute's purview. In Edler, 579 F.2d 516, a conviction under the ITAR was reversed
on evidentiary grounds and remanded for a new trial. Defendants were charged with
providing information and expertise to a French missile company after their application
for an ITAR license was denied. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit construed
the ITAR in the light of its promulgation under the Mutual Security Act of 1954 and
rejected defendants' overbreadth arguments. Recognizing the overbreadth challenge and
that "an expansive interpretation of technical data relating to items on the Munitions List
could seriously impede scientific research and publishing on the international scientific
exchange," 579 F.2d at 519, the Ninth Circuit adopted a narrow construction of the
ITAR. The court held that "[the Mutual Security Act of 1954] and the accompanying
regulations prohibits [sic] only the exportation of technical data significantly and directly
related to specific articles on the Munitions List. . . [and]. . . the defendant must know
or have reason to know that its information is intended for the prohibited use." Id. at
521. Whether the Ninth Circuit's attempt to narrow the applicability of the ITAR was
sufficient to preserve the regulations against the constitutional infirmity of overbreadth is
beyond the scope of this Note.
The expansive scope and indeterminate nature of activities subject to the ITAR also
open the regulations to a void-for-vagueness challenge. See Memorandum from J. Har-
mon, supra note 45, at 283-84. As noted in Eder, it is difficult to determine what activi-
ties do not require an ITAR license. See supra note 93. Hence, an arbitrary or
discriminatory application of the ITAR penalties is possible. The existence of indeter-
minable proscribed standards of conduct and unlimited discretion in the hands of the
enforcers of a statute are the crux of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. See generally Note,
The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19 (1940), however, may settle any attack on the ITAR
on this basis. In Gorin, defendants were convicted for violations of the Espionage Act of
June 15, 1917. Defendants claimed that the jury instructions at their trial, which quoted
from the Act's language proscribing espionage activities "related to the National
defense," were unconstitutionally vague. The Court held that, in light of the Act's scien-
ter requirement, the Act was "sufficiently specific to advise the ordinary man of its
scope." 312 U.S. at 32. Because the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 also carries the
requirement of a willful violation, 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (1982), and employs terms that
closely track the statute at issue in Gorin, a void-for-vagueness challenge to the ITAR
also should fail.
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determination before a final restraint is effected. 118
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE
AGAINST PRIOR RESTRAINTS
Governments have attempted to control publication by licens-
ing since as early as 1501.119 This type of prior restraint was espe-
cially prevalent in England during the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. 120 Responding to criticism, the British common law and
Parliament eventually limited the scope of licensing systems.
Indeed, Blackstone noted that:
[Freedom of the press] consists in laying noprevious restraints upon publica-
tions, and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published.
Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases
before the public: to forbid this, is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if
he publishes what is improper, mischieviouss [sic] or illegal, he must take the
consequence of his own temerity. 2 '
In order to expand public support for the United States Consti-
tution, the Framers adopted the Bill of Rights to safeguard certain
freedoms. 122 First among these enumerated rights is: "Congress
shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press . . . ."12 The Supreme Court has adopted a Blackstonian
construction of the first amendment, under which freedom of the
press is essentially freedom from prior restraints. 124 The Court has
held that this construction is necessary to the liberty of the press
envisioned by the Framers. 12 Indeed, in Patterson v. Colorado, 126
Justice Holmes wrote that the main purpose and effect of the free-
dom of the press clause "is to prevent all such previous restraints
upon publication as had been practised by other governments
118. See infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
119. See Emerson, The Doctrine of Pior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 648,
650 (1955).
120. Id
121. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMmENTARiEs at 151-52 (emphasis in original).
122. James Madison said when introducing the Bill of Rights in the House of Repre-
sentatives: "I believe that the great mass of the people who opposed [the Constitution
adopted in 1789] disliked it because it did not contain certain effectual provisions against
the encroachments on particular rights .. " 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433 (J. Gales ed.
1789).
123. U.S. CoNsT. amend. L
124. See Murphy, Near v. Minnesota in the Context of Historicai Developments, 66
MINN. L. Rlv. 95 (198 1); The Constitution of the United States of America: .Analysis an'd
Interpretation, S. Doc. No. 82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 936-37 (1973). The Court also has
adhered to the second tenet of Blackstone's formulation: criminal sanctions may follow
publication. See generaly Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraints: The Central
Linkage, 66 MiNe. L. Rnv. 11 (1981).
125. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716-18 (1932) (striking down a state statute that
created a prior restraint of newspaper stories of a scandalous nature).
126. 205 U.S. 454 (1907) (upholding a state supreme court contempt order following
publication of an article and a cartoon).
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.... "127 While an important reason for the Court's view of prior
restraints as antithetical to free speech is that such restraints curtail
"the advancement of truth, science, morality and arts in general," 128
the primary purpose of the Court's construction is to ensure an
informed public, "the most potent of all restraints upon
misgovernment." 2 9
B. THE INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS Do
NOT PROVIDE THE PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARD OF
MANDATORY COURT REVIEW
In the few cases upholding prior restraints of speech, the Court
has required that the restraints be accompanied by specific and sub-
stantive procedural safeguards.' 30 In Freedman v. Maryland'31 the
Court summarized the procedural protections necessary to sustain a
system of prior restraints: (1) the government must either issue a
license promptly or initiate a court proceeding to restrain publica-
tion; (2) the court proceeding must be adversarial in nature and the
burden of proving that the publication is unprotected must be on the
government; (3) while the government can require advance submis-
sion of a publication to a licensing board, the board's determination
must be prompt and can not be administered in a manner that would
"lend an effect of finality" to its decision; and (4) any restraint
imposed prior to a final judicial determination must be limited to the
preservation of the status quo and last for the shortest time reason-
ably possible. 32 The Court also places on the government the bur-
den of demonstrating the particular facts to justify a restraint. 33
Further, if a court-ordered restraint has been imposed, the govern-
ment must either stay the order pending its appeal or provide imme-
diate appellate review.' 34
127. Id. at 462 (emphasis and citations omitted).
128. Letter from Continental Congress to the Inhabitants of Quebec (October 26,
1974), 1 JOURNAL OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 108, quotedin Near, 238 U.S. at 717.
129. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) (striking down state
licensing tax on newspapers with large circulations).
130. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 521 (1957) ("[When assessing government
restraints on speech] the procedures by which the facts of the case are adjudicated are of
special importance and the validity of the restraint may turn on the safeguards which
they afford."). See also L. TRIE, supra note 79, at 734-35.
131. 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (finding a film censorship statute requiring the submission of
films to an administrative board before showing to be an unconstitutional prior
restraint).
132. Id. at 58-59.
133. Speiser, 357 U.S. at 526 (invalidating denial of tax exemptions to persons who
could not prove that they did not advocate violent overthrow of the government).
134. Nat'l Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977) (per
curiam) (overturning a state court's injunction of Nazi Party demonstration where the
Illinois Supreme Court had refused a petition for expedited appeal of the injunction
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The ITAR, a lower federal court's recent construction of the
regulations, 135 and the State Department's latest interpretation of the
ITAR, 136 all fail to provide procedural protections that the Supreme
Court requires for a system of prior restraints on speech. Most nota-
order). Although Freedman was a film censorship case, and Speiser and Nat'l Socialist
Party respectively arose in the contexts of tax litigation and an enjoined parade, their
procedural protections apply to any system of prior restraints of speech protected by the
first amendment. Conrad, 420 U.S. at 558. See generally Blasi, supra note 124.
135. A judicial construction which imposes necessary procedural safeguards on an
otherwise constitutionally infirm prior restraint statute may validate the restraint. Freed-
man, 380 U.S. at 58-59. In Edler, 579 F.2d 516, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit dismissed a challenge to the ITAR that was based on the regulations' procedural
deficiencies. The court found the challenge to be without merit because the licensee had
ample opportunity to seek administrative review of the ITAR license denial under 22
C.F.R. § 123.05 (1983) and could initiate a court review of the denial, after the restraint
was effected, under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982). The Ninth
Circuit seriously misconstrued the holding of Freedman and its progeny. Freedman and
its progeny clearly hold that the burden is on the government to seek and secure a court
order before a final restraint is imposed. See supra 'notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
The availability of administrative review, or the opportunity for court review of the final
restraint after the fact and at the initiation of the person whose publication is restrained,
in no way lessens the government's burden or validates an otherwise impermissible prior
restraint. That the Edler case does not settle the procedural infirmities of the ITAR
under the constitution has been recognized by a Deputy Assistant Attorney General who
noted that, "while the Ninth Circuit's decision [in Edler] is helpful in resolving First
Amendment issues with respect to blueprints and similar types of technical data used as a
basis for producing military equipment, we do not believe that it either resolves the First
Amendment issues presented by restrictions on export of cryptographic ideas or elimi-
nates the need to reexamine the ITAR." Letter from L. Hammond, Department of Jus-
tice, to W. Kay, Office of Science and Technology Policy (Aug. 29, 1978), reprinted in
House Hearings, supra note 6, at 264-65.
136. In February 1980, the Department of State issued a statement on the ITAR,
Dept. of State, 80 Munitions Control Newsletter (February 1980), reprinted in House
Hearings, supra note 6, at 262-63, in response to the court's holding in Edler, 579 F.2d
516. The Newsletter reads:
Cryptography/Technical Data
Concern has been voiced that ITAR provisions relating to the export of technical
data as applied to cryptologic equipment can be so broadly interpreted as to
restrict scientific exchanges of basic mathematical and engineering research data.
The Office of Munitions Control wishes to clarify the application of the technical
data provisions of Section 121.01, Category XVIII, of the ITAR as applied to
equipment found in Categories XI(c) and XJII(b) of the Munitions List.
Cryptologic technical data for which a license is required under Section
121.01, Category XVIII, is interpreted by this office with respect to information
relating to Munitions List items in Categories XI(c) and XJII(b) to include only
such information as is designed or intended to be used, or which reasonably
could be expected to be given direct application, in the design, production, man-
ufacture, repair, overhaul, processing, engineering, development, operation,
maintenance or reconstruction of items in such categories. This interpretation
includes, in addition to engineering and design data, information designed or
reasonably expected to be used to make equipment more effective, such as
encoding or enciphering techniques and systems, and communications or signal
security techniques and guidelines, as well as other cryptographic and cryptana-
lytic methods and procedures. It does not include general mathematical, engi-
neering or statistical information, not purporting to have or reasonably expected
to be given direct application to equipment in such categories. It does not
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bly absent is the required provision for a judicial determination
before a final restraint is imposed. Thus, unless a constitutional
exception applies to prior restraints of public cryptography publica-
tions, the ITAR, as noted by the Department of Justice,1 37 is an
unconstitutional prior restraint.
IV
A NATIONAL SECURITY EXCEPTION TO THE
FREEDOM OF SPEECH FROM PRIOR
RESTRAINTS DOCTRINE
Prior restraints of speech "are not unconstitutionalper se," 1 38
and first amendment protection is not "absolutely unlimited."1 39 In
a few special areas, legislatures have authorized and the Supreme
Court has upheld prior restraints.14° In particular, the Court has
recognized a few narrow exceptions to the first amendment under
which prior restraints are constitutional, even if the restraints fail to
satisfy the procedural requirements of Freedman and its progeny.
include basic theoretical research data. It does, however, include algorithms and
other procedures purporting to have advanced cryptologic application.
The public is reminded that professional and academic presentation and infor-
mal discussions, as well as demonstrations of equipment, constituting disclosure
of cryptologic technical data to foreign nationals, are prohibited without the
prior approval of this office. Approval is not required for publication of data
within the United States as described in Section 125.11 (a)(1). [See supra note
101 and accompanying text.] Footnote 3 to Section 125.11 does not establish a
prepublication review requirement. [See supra note 102.].
The interpretation set forth in this newsletter should exclude from the licens-
ing provisions of the ITAR most basic scientific data and other theoretical
research information, except for information intended or reasonably expected to
have a direct cryptologic application. Because of concerns expressed to this
office that licensing procedures for proposed disclosures of cryptologic technical
data contained in professional and academic papers and oral representations
could cause burdensome delays in exchanges with foreign scientists, this office
will expedite consideration as to the application of ITAR to such disclosures. If
requested, we will, on an expedited basis provide an opinion as to whether any
proposed disclosure, for other than commercial purposes, of information rele-
vant to cryptology, would require licensing under the ITAR.
The Newsletter does not significantly amend the prior restraint system of the ITAR, nor
does it institute the procedural requirements necessary to a valid system of prior
restraints. A House committee criticized the Newsletter because it "clarif[ies] little while
insisting that algorithms can be dangerous if they purport to have advanced cryptologic
application." House REPORT, supra note 17, at 68.
137. See Memorandum from J. Harmon, supra note 45.
138. Conrad, 420 U.S. at 558.
139. Near, 283 U.S. at 716.
140. See, eg., 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976) (National Labor Relations Board empowered
to issue cease and desist orders against employers found to violate protected rights of
employees); 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1982) (Federal Trade Commission empowered to enjoin
unfair methods of competition). Such orders often restrict what may be spoken or writ-
ten under certain specified circumstances. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S.
575, 616-20 (1969).
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These exceptions include copyrighted works141 and some publica-
tions by government employees, 42 especially those in the military. 143
In Near v. Minnesota 44 the Court first alluded to another qualifica-
tion to the first amendment's condemnation of prior restraints of
speech, a national security exception. Any allegation that public
cryptography will disclose the nation's most sensitive secrets inher-
ently involves national security issues; thus, the applicability of a
national security exception to public cryptography publications must
be determined in order to assess the constitutionality of the ITAR.
The ITAR licensing system, although it fails to provide sufficient
procedural safeguards, 145 may fall within a national security excep-
tion and thus withstand a first amendment challenge.
A. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL SECURITY
ExCEPTION TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court wrote in 1931 that "the protection even as
to previous restraint is not absolutely unlimited .... .No one would
question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction of
its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of trans-
ports or the number and location of troops."' 46  Although some
members of the Court have sought to limit application of this first
amendment exception to times of war,147 and others have sought to
eliminate the exception completely, 48 a majority of the Court never
has adopted either view.'4 9 In recent years the preservation of
national security has been offered as justification for various govern-
141. Westermann Co. v. Dispatch Co., 249 U.S. 100 (1919) (ordering injunctive relief
for copyright violations).
142. C.S.C. v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (upholding restrictions on political
activities by federal employees).
143. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1979) (upholding regulations that created a prior
restraint of petitions on a military base).
144. 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (dictum).
145. See supra note 130-37 and accompanying text.
146. Near, 283 U.S. at 716. "'When a nation is at war many things that might be said
in time of peace are such a hinderance to its efforts that their utterance will not be
endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any
constitutional right."' Id (quoting Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)). It
is probably because of this narrow confine that the Court rarely has explicated a national
security exception to the first amendment.
147. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 714, 726 (1970) (Bren-
nan, ., concurring). ("Our cases, it is true, have indicated that there is a single,
extremely narrow class of cases in which the First Amendment ban on prior judicial
restraint may be overridden. Our cases have thus far indicated that such cases may arise
only when the Nation is at war.").
148. See, e.g., id at 714-24 (Black, J., and Douglas, J., concurring).
149. Cf. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 303 (1981) (upholding passport revocation over a
first amendment challenge) ("History eloquently attests that grave problems of national
security and foreign policy are by no means limited to times of formally declared war.").
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mental actions.1 50 In some of these instances the Court has found
the preservation of national security to be a sufficiently compelling
interest to overcome individual rights traditionally thought to be
protected by the Constitution. 51 If these decisions portend an
expanded application of a national security exception to the first
amendment, then the ITAR could be judged a constitutional prior
restraint.
The maintenance of national security is the most compelling
interest the federal government can offer to defend its actions.152
The Court sometimes uses the term "national security" interchange-
ably with the phrases "war power,"'153 "foreign policy,"' 54 and
"national defense."' 55 The Court's most common definition of
national security is expansive: a "generic concept of broad connota-
tions, referring to the military and naval establishments and the
related activities of national preparedness."'' 56  This definition
encompasses the activities of federal intelligence services, including
the NSA.' 57
Although the scope of federal activities that legally may be pur-
sued in the interests of national security has not been defined with
precision, 58 it is clear that these activities can have an enormous
impact on individual freedoms. 59 The Court recognizes, however,
150. See, e.g., id; Brown, 444 U.S. 348 (upholding prior restraints of petitions on a
military base); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1975) (upholding ban on civilian petitions
on a military base); United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972)
(denying warrantless domestic surveilance); New York Times Co., 403 U.S. 714; United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (finding employment practices at federal defense
facilities unconstitutional); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1951) (enjoining Executive order to seize domestic steel mills).
151. See cases cited supra note 150. See generally Martin, National Security and the
First Amendment;A Change in Perspective, 68 A.B.A.J. 680 (1982). "It is difficult to view
... [these]. . . cases without a sense that there is a changing judicial attitude toward the
kind of national security claims that were put forward and almost summarily rejected in
the Pentagon Papers case." Id at 684.
152. Agee, 453 U.S. at 307. "'It is obvious and unarguable that no governmental
interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.'" Id (quoting with approval
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509 (1964)).
153. See, e.g., Robel, 389 U.S. at 264.
154. See, e.g., Agee, 453 U.S. at 300.
155. See, e.g., Robel, 389 U.S. at 264.
156. Gorin, 312 U.S. at 28.
157. SeeAgee, 453 U.S. at 307 ("Measures to protect the secrecy of our Government's
foreign intelligence plainly serve . . . [national security interests] ... ."); Snepp v.
United States, 444 U.S. 507, 526 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In view of the national
interest in maintaining an effective intelligence service, I am not prepared to say that [a
prepublication review of a government employee's manuscript] is necessarily intolerable
158. See generally Note, Developments-National Security, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1130
(1972).
159. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding forced
internment of Americans of Japanese heritage to prevent possibility of espionage).
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that national security "cannot be invoked as a talismanic incantation
to support any exercise" of federal power.160 No "particular exercise
of foreign affairs power [is] exempt from limitations in favor of indi-
vidual rights,"1 61 and "even the war power does not remove constitu-
tional limitations safeguarding individual liberties."1 62
Probably because of the stringent conditions necessary to
invoke the national security exception as envisioned in Near, 163 the
Court has not defined precisely the scope of the exception. The
Court utilizes no mechanical test to determine the applicability of
the exception in a particular case. Rather, the Court begins its anal-
ysis with a "heavy presumption'" 64 against the restraint in issue, and
requires the government to prove a justification for the restraint. 165
In New York Times Co. v. United States, 166 the Court denied an
injunction to restrain the publication of purloined Pentagon docu-
ments regarding American involvement in the Vietnam War. 167 The
Court reached this decision over Executive assertions of a national
security need to prevent disclosure 68 but, in its brief per curiam
opinion, did not expressly address the national security exception.
The opinion did reaffirm earlier statements that "[a]ny system of
prior restraints of expressions comes to this Court bearing a heavy
presumption against its constitutional validity .... -169 The gov-
ernment "thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the
imposition of such a restraint."' 70 The six concurring opinions and
three dissenting opinions, however, expressed a wide range of views
on the proper scope of a national security exception. Justices Black
and Douglas took absolutist positions, that would not allow prior
restraints even in times of war.171 Justice Brennan would limit the
exception to circumstances that would "inevitably, directly and
160. Robe, 389 U.S. at 263.
161. HENKIN, supra note 79, at 253.
162. Robe, 389 U.S. at 264. "Implicit in the term 'national defense' is the notion of
defending those values and ideals which set this nation apart. For almost two centuries,
our country has taken singular pride in the democratic ideals enshrined in its Constitu-
tion, and the most cherished of those ideals have found expression in the First Amend-
ment. It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would sanction
the subversion of one of those liberties - the freedom of association - which makes the
defense of the Nation worthwhile." Id (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blarsdell,
290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934)).
163. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
164. New York Tines Co., 403 U.S. at 714 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
165. Id.
166. 403 U.S. 714 (1970) (per curiam).
167. Seeid at 714.
168. See id at 731 (White, J., concurring).
169. Id. at 714 (quoting Bantam Books, 372 U.S. at 70).
170. Id (quoting Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
171. I.d at 714 (Black, J., concurring); Zd at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling
the safety of a transport already at sea." 172 Justices White and Stew-
art took a more moderate position that would require "express and
appropriately limited congressional authorization for prior
restraint"' 173 when "direct, immediate and irreparable damage to our
Nation' 174 is shown. Justice Marshall focused on the congressional
history behind the particular restraint requested by the Executive.
175
Justice Marshall's analysis was most consistent with past Court hold-
ings reconciling individual freedoms with Executive actions taken in
the interest of national security but in conflict with congressional
authorizations. 176 Justice Marshall stated that because Congress
expressly had denied to the Executive the type of prior restraint that
the government sought, the Court did not have "the power to make
law" by granting the injunction. 177
Justices Burger and Blackmun joined in a dissent by Justice
Harlan 78 that enunciated a lenient standard for the application of a
national security exception. Justice Harlan would allow a prior
restraint if the Executive showed that the material to be restrained
touched on the President's foreign policy powers and that the deci-
sion to enjoin a publication had been made by an appropriate cabi-
net secretary. 179 The dissenting Justices, however, primarily were
troubled by the swiftness of the Court's decision. Chief Justice Bur-
ger stated, "[t]here are no doubt. . . exceptions [other than Near's
national security exception] which no one has [had] occasion to
describe or discuss."' 80 Justice Blackmun wrote that the government
had a "very narrow right"'' to restrain some publications, but
would have remanded the case for further development of the
record.' 82
In all, seven justices wrote that a prior restraint of the press is
not a per se violation of the first amendment. 8 3 For a time, it
appeared that the test enunciated by Justice Stewart might prevail;
Justice Brennan adopted it in his concurrence in Nebraska Press
172. Id at 726-27 (Brennan, L, concurring).
173. Id at 731 (White, J., concurring).
174. Id
175. See id at 740-49 (Marshall, J., concurring).
176. See infra note 225-53 and accompanying text.
177. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 741 (Marshall, J., concurring).
178. Id at 752-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
179. Id
180. Id at 749 (Burger, C.L, dissenting).
181. Id at 761 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
182. Id
183. See id at 724-62 (concurrences by Brennan, J., Stewart, J., White, J., Marshall, J.;
dissents by Burger, C.J., Harlan, J., Blackmun, J.).
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Association v. Stuart.184 It is now clear, however, that no one test,
and certainly none presenting as "formidable"'185 an obstacle to prior
restraints as that proposed by Justice Stewart, ever has controlled a
majority of the Court. Instead, the Court, when considering first
amendment cases involving national security, appears to weigh six
critical factors. These dominant concerns are: (1) the type of indi-
vidual liberty infringed; (2) the magnitude of the danger to be
avoided; (3) the scope of the President's power in the affected area;
(4) congressional approval of the restraints; (5) whether government
employees or funds are involved; and (6) whether the speech dis-
closes classified information. It is the interplay of these factors that
determines if particular speech is protected or constitutionally may
be restrained to protect national security. The balance struck by
weighing these interests determines whether a national security
exception will apply in an individual case. There is no blanket
verbalization of when the exception applies, no standard test. But
when these factors have appeared in a proper combination, the
Court has upheld restraints on first amendment liberties upon find-
ing only a "substantial likelihood of serious damage to national
security or foreign policy .... ,186 Thus, the Court has come a long
way from the implied message of Near, that speech could be
restrained under a national security justification only in times of
war.'
87
By balancing these six factors it is possible to assess the constitu-
tional validity of the ITAR's prior restraints on public cryptography
publications vis-a-vis a national security exception. Although these
publications are a protected form of speech,18 8 the disclosure of fed-
eral codes and cryptologic abilities, even if disclosure is inadvertant,
184. 427 U.S. at 593 (Brennan, J., concurring).
185. Id at 594.
186. Agee, 453 U.S. at 147. Agee involved the activities of a former government
employee. This fact was critical to the Court's lowering of the first amendment protec-
tions of Agee's liberties. Employees of the government do have first amendments rights.
See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (reinstating a teacher who
was dismissed for writing a letter criticizing a school board's handling of financial mat-
ters). But these rights may be curtailed by the government to meet important govern-
ment interests. See, e.g., C.S.C. v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973). This is especially
true in cases involving the "specialized society" of the military. See, e.g., Brown, 444
U.S. at 354. In the military setting, for example, the Court has construed narrowly legis-
lation intended to protect a soldier's first amendment rights in order to uphold the consti-
tutionality of military regulations that banned petitions on base. See id If theAgee test
is limited to government employees, then a more protective standard would apply to
private researchers. When an individual accepts government employment, information,
or funding, however, he should be aware that such governmental contacts may furnish a
sufficient premise for a subsequent narrowing of his first amendment liberties. See, e.g.,
Snepp, 444 U.S. 507.
187. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
188. See supra note 112.
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could cause serious damage to national security.'8 9 Still, these publi-
cations' potential to harm national security can not automatically
place all such writings within a national security exception. The
magnitude of the danger posed to national security will turn on the
facts of a particular case;. thus, it becomes necessary to consider each
restraint individually.190 And two other factors-whether classified
information is involved and whether government employees are
involved-are by definition inapplicable to public cryptography. 191
It is critical, then, to examine the remaining two factors to determine
the applicability of a national security exception to the imposition of
prior restraints on public cryptography publications: the scope of
the relevant foreign policy powers of the President and the legislative
history of the restraints. The President's foreign policy powers are
involved because the government uses codes to protect its interna-
tional relationships.' 92 It is necessary to consider congressional his-
tory because of Congress' constitutional power to control foreign
commerce 93 and because the prior restraints of the ITAR are pre-
mised on the Arms Export Control Act of 1976.194 Weighing these
factors will allow a determination of the constitutionality of the
ITAR restraints.
B. JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO EXECUTIVE NATIONAL
SECURITY POWERS
The powers of the President to protect national security from
foreign threats are vast. 95 Article II of the Constitution describes
some of the Executive's powers in matters of national security.' 9
6
The structure "of the federal government, the facts of national life,
189. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
190. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 521 (1957) ("[T]he validity of a restraint on
speech in each case depends on careful analysis of the particular circumstances.").
191. See supra note 5.
192. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
195. Judicial reluctance to impose limits on these powers is often founded in the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine. Pursuant to this doctrine, the Court sometimes has taken the
extreme position that matters related "to the conduct of foreign relations . . . are so
exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune
from judicial inquiry or interference." Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589
(1952) (upholding deportation of alien on the basis of his political beliefs). See also
Chicago & Southern Airlines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) ("Such
decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of govern-
ment, Executive and Legislative."). Even the President, when exercising his foreign pol-
icy powers, however, must not violate the first amendment. See infra notes 213-16 and
accompanying text.
196. See, eg., U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl. 1: "The President shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States;" id at cl. 2: "He shall have Power
... to make Treaties. . . and. .. appoint Ambassadors."
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the realities and exigencies of international relations, [and] the prac-
tices of diplomacy," however, have required a greatly expanded rec-
ognition of these Executive powers. 197 Consequently, the Supreme
Court, using a separation of powers rationale, has expanded the
scope of the Executive's foreign policy power beyond the language of
the Constitution,198 and accords great deference to exercises of the
power.199 This deference is greatest concerning Executive actions
taken at the international level;200 the Court is less willing to extend
deference to domestic Executive actions taken for foreign policy or
national security reasons.201 In United States v. Curtiss- Wright
Corp.,202 the Court characterized the Executive's foreign policy
power as "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the Pres-
ident as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of inter-
national relations .. ".. -o3 The activities of the NSA fall within
this presidential authority. Indeed, the Court said inHaig v. Agee2°4
that "[m]easures to protect the secrecy of our Government's foreign
intelligence operations plainly serve . . . [national security]
interests." 205
Judicial deference to Executive actions aimed at safeguarding
national security sometimes stems from the Court's perception that
the judiciary has inadequate expertise in matters of foreign policy.
This consideration was important to the Court's holding in Curtiss-
Wright.206 The Court enunciated this view in Chicago & Southern
Airlines v. Waterman S.S. Corp. :207
The President both as Commander-in-Chief and as the nation's organ for
foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are not and
ought not be published to the world. It would be intolerable that courts,
without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions
of the Executive taken on information properly held secret.20 8
197. HENKIN, supra note 79, at 37.
198. See generally id, ch. II.
199. See, e.g., Agee, 453 U.S. at 292. "[M]atters relating to the conduct of foreign
relations.., are so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be
largely immune from judicial inquiry or interference." Id (quoting Harlsiades, 342 U.S.
at 589).
200. See L. TRmE, supra note 79, at 158-63. See also supra note 195.
201. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 635 (1952) (granting
an injunction to enjoin President Truman's seizure of domestic steel mills during the
Korean War). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 79, at 181-84; Curtiss- Wright, 299 U.S. at
320; infra note 218.
202. 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (upholding Executive embargo on the sale of arms in the
Chaco region of South America).
203. Id at 320.
204. 453 U.S. 280 (1981). See supra note 157.
205. Id at 307.
206. See id at 319.
207. 333 U.S. 103 (1948) (upholding Civil Aeronautics Board's award of international
air routes because they ultimately were subject to Executive approval).
208. I at 111.
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The Court has continued to utilize the rationale of judicial inex-
pertise in foreign policy matters in recent cases upholding Executive
national security actions. 20 9 Although these recent cases involved
former government employees, 210 the disposition of the Court to
defer to the Executive on questions of national security could surface
in a case involving a prior restraint of a public cryptography publica-
tion. For reasons discussed below, 21 1 a perception of judicial incom-
petency alone would be insufficient justification for placing public
cryptography wholly outside first amendment protections. The per-
ception, however, could lessen the government's burden to prove
harm to national security before imposing a restraint on these publi-
cations.212 In such a case the government could argue that an under-
standing of the mathematical intricacies of cryptology, and
determination of the potential effect of a particular publication on
national security, are beyond judicial competence. This could be a
209. For example, in Snepp, 444 U.S. 507, the Court created a constructive trust for
the benefit of the government from the profits the defendant, a former employee of the
CIA, earned from his book about American intelligence operations. The book contained
no classified information. 444 U.S. at 511. The Court ordered the relief because the
defendant had violated his contract agreement to submit his manuscript to the CIA for
prepublication censorship. By basing its holding on contract and agency principles and
by employing a constructive trust remedy, the Court did away with any need for the
government to prove specific harm to national security. The government would have
had to prove such harm had the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit's award of punitive damages. See United States v. Snepp, 595 F.2d 926 (4th Cir.
1974). The Court noted that "[p]roof of the tortious conduct necessary to sustain an
award of punitive damages might force the government to disclose some of the very
confidences [it wants to protect]." 444 U.S. at 514. Rather, the Court primarily relied on
the general testimony of Admiral Stansfield Turner, then Director of the CIA, to support
its assumption that the defendant's book posed a threat to national security. See id at
512-13.
This same perception of judicial incompetence surfaced inAgee, 453 U.S. 280. The
Court held for the government without requiring proof of what dangerous information
was possessed by Agee or how it could harm national security. See 453 U.S. at 320 n.10
(Brennan, J., concurring). Important to the Court's holding was that Agee, like Snepp,
was a former government employee and the information restrained was received by him
while in the government's employment. See supra note 186.
Because public cryptography by definition operates without government funds or
information, supra note 5, the judicial deference to Executive allegations of harm to
national security in Snepp andAgee should not apply in a court's review of the constitu-
tionality of the ITAR prior restraints on public cryptography publications. In cases
where the government seeks to restrain purely private speech, as in public cryptography
under the ITAR, the Court requires an assessment of the particular danger to national
security from a specific publication before authorizing its restraint. See Speiser, 357 U.S.
at 521.
210. See supra notes 186 and 209.
211. See infra notes 213-16 and 222-26 and accompanying text.
212. Cf. Hayden v. Nat'l Security Agency, 608 F.2d 1381, 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(affirming denial of request under the Freedom of Information Act for NSA files)
("Especially concerning the NSA signals intelligence mission, a court cannot demand as
complete a public record as in many other contexts-even other intelligence contexts-
without imperiling legitimate secrecy interests.").
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persuasive argument to decrease the government's burden to con-
vince a court that a particular publication should be restrained.
The Court's deference to the President's national security pow-
ers is not unlimited, especially when domestic application of those
powers is in question.21 3 "[I]t is error to suppose that every case or
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cog-
nizance." 214 When an individual's constitutional rights are in issue,
judicial deference is not an acceptable mode of review. Indeed,
"[t]he Supreme Court has never invoked the political question doc-
trine to dismiss an individual's claim that a foreign relations action
deprived him of constitutional rights. ' 215 Because the ITAR affects
first amendment liberties, a court should not dismiss a challenge to
the ITAR restraints on public cryptography solely because they
involve elements of national security. The national security power,
"like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordi-
nation to the applicable provisions of the Constitution," 21 6 including
the first amendment.
C. THE ROLE OF CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY: LIMITS TO
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO EXECUTIVE NATIONAL
SECURITY ACTIONS
The Executive can not place the ITAR restraints within an
exception to first amendment protections simply by advancing a
national security interest. But the potential applicability of a
national security exception requires further analysis. It is necessary
to consider congressional attitudes toward the ITAR licensing sys-
tem, because the Court accords Executive national security actions
greater deference when they have been authorized by statute.217
Congressional authorization strengthens the President's hand,
notwithstanding the breadth of the legislation found by the Court to
contemplate the challenged action.218 The Court takes this approach
213. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579.
214. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
215. HENKIN, supra note 79, at 486 n.6.
216. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
217. See, e.g., Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("When the Presi-
dent acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at
its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress
can delegate.. . ."); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 674 (1980) (upholding
presidential transfer of all Iranian property subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States: "Because the President's action ... was taken pursuant to specific congressional
authorization, it is 'supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of
judicial interpretation'. . ." (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring)). See also supra note 74 and accompanying text.
218. See, e.g., Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678. "TIt]he enactment of legislation
closely related to the question of the President's authority in a particular case which
evinces legislative intent to accord the President broad discretion may be considered to
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"because of the changeable and explosive nature of contemporary
international relations, and the fact that the Executive is immedi-
ately privy to information which cannot be swiftly presented to, eval-
uated by, and acted upon by the legislature. Congress-in giving the
Executive authority over matters in foreign affairs-must of neces-
sity paint with a brush broader than it customarily wields in domes-
tic areas. ' 219 Even legislative silence can evince congressional
approval in the areas of national security and foreign relations, 220
provided that Congress is aware of the Executive's action.221 Thus,
if Congress authorized the ITAR prior restraints on public cryptog-
raphy publications, a court would be more likely to find that the
restraints are within a national security exception to the first amend-
ment and, therefore, more likely to find them constitutionally valid.
The ITAR's prior restraints on public cryptography publica-
tions involve Executive national security powers,222 Congress' power
to control foreign commerce,223 and a first amendment liberty.224
The decisions of the Supreme Court call for a sophisticated analysis
to balance these competing and conflicting constitutional interests.
The Court determines the appropriate balance by employing an ana-
lytical model which weighs whether Congress authorized or
approved of the Executive's actions, and whether the Executive and
Congress possess concurrent powers in the particular area. The out-
come of this analysis should determine whether the ITAR prior
restraints on public cryptography fall within a national security
exception to the first amendment. Justice Jackson described this
analytical model in his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer:225
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization
of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. [Such
executive actions]... would be supported by the strongest of presump-
'invite' measures on independent Presidential responsibility." Id (quoting Youngstown,
343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring)); Curtiss-Wnght, 299 U.S. at 320
("[Congressional legislation which is to be made effective ... within the international
field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statu-
tory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.").
219. Agee, 453 U.S. at 292 (quoting Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1964)).
220. See, e.g., id at 291 ("[ln the areas of foreign policy and national security,.
Congressional silence is not to be equated with Congressional disapproval."); Dames &
Moore, 453 U.S. at 678; Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 8-12 (1964).
221. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686: "a systematic, unbroken executive practice,
long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned... may be
treated as a gloss on 'Executive Power' vested in the President. . . ." (quoting Youngs-
town, 343 U.S. at 610-11) (Frankfurter, 3., concurring)). See Zemel, 381 U.S. at 11.
222. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 112.
225. 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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tions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of
persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers,
but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have con-
current authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore,
congressional inertia, indifference or acquiescence may sometimes, at
least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent
presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely
to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables
rather than on abstract theories of law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can
rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presi-
dential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting
upon the subject. 2 6
The ITAR falls within Justice Jackson's second category, the
"twilight" of concurrent jurisdiction. The regulation of foreign com-
merce is an express constitutional power of Congress.227 At the same
time, the President's duty to protect national security encompasses
the security of federal codes and the maintenance of the effective
operation of the NSA.2 8 Accordingly, congressional attitudes
toward and actions affecting the prior restraint system of the ITAR
are critical to a determination of the constitutionality of the ITAR
licensing system.
The ITAR has been in existence since the enactment of the
Mutual Security Act of 1954.229 But neither the 1954 Act and the
1976 Arms Export Control Act,20 nor their legislative histories,23 1
mention the restraints imposed by the ITAR. The 1976 Act contains
only general language that "the President is authorized to control the
import and the export of defense articles and defense services
* . ."232 that he has designated as items on the United States Muni-
tions List. Although the Department of State bases the ITAR prior
226. Id at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). The Court recently employed this model
in Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. 654. Its application also was crucial to the concurrence of
Justice White, joined by Justice Stewart, in New York Times: "At least in the absence of
legislation by Congress, based on its own investigations and findings, I am quite unable
to agree that the inherent powers of the Executive and the courts reach so far as to
authorize remedies having such sweeping potential for inhibiting publications by the
press." 403 U.S. at 782 (White, J., joined by Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Marshall
also used the model in his concurrence: "When the Congress specifically declines to
make conduct unlawful it is not for this Court to redecide those issues--to overrule Con-
gress." Id at 745-46 (Marshall, J., concurring).
227. See supra note 79.
228. See supra note 157.
229. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 105.
232. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (1982).
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restraints on this statutory language, 33 the language is too general to
allow one to find congressional deliberation on and approval of the
ITAR prior restraints on public cryptography. The Court has relied
on similarly broad language in the foreign policy arena to find that
Congress has "implicitly approved" a challenged Executive foreign
policy action, but only when that language has been supported by
other consistent congressional enactments and legislative histories.234
The requisite consistent congressional actions are not present in this
instance. 35
The absence of congressional action limiting the licensing sys-
tem's prior restraints on public cryptography during the ITAR's
thirty year existence could be interpreted as constituting implicit
congressional acquiesence in the restraints. But congressional
approval can not be implied from legislative silence unless Congress
had knowledge of the Executive action in issue.236 Significantly,
there is no evidence that Congress knew of the ITAR's prior
restraints on public cryptography until Congress held hearings on
the subject in 1980.23 7 Even the Justice Department apparently was
unaware of the restraints until 1978Z.28 Since learning of the ITAR
prior restraints on public cryptography, the House Committee on
Government Operations has issued a report recommending that the
Department of State "review and rewrite the ITAR to satisfy consti-
tutional objections."' ' 9 The Executive would be hard-pressed to
argue that Congress, once aware of the ITAR prior restraints on
public cryptography, gave implicit approval to the licensing system
and acquiesced in the ITAR's abridgement of first amendment
freedoms.
The Executive's power to enforce the ITAR as a prior restraint
actually is "at its lowest ebb,"24° because that action is incompatible
with the expressed will of Congress. Congress, on at least two occa-
sions, has rejected legislation that would have given the Executive
prior restraint powers similar to those that the Department of State
has promulgated under the ITAR. During a 1917 debate over the
233. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
234. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680-81; Zemel, 381 U.S. at 8-12.
235. See infra notes 240-53 and accompanying text.
236. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680-81; Zemel, 381 U.S. at 8-12.
237. House Hearings, supra note 6. See generally HOUSE REPORT, supra note 17, at
62-119.
238. The Department learned of the restraints from an internal memorandum. See
Memorandum from J. Harmon, supra note 45. See also House Hearings, supra note 6, at
266-67 (testimony of H. Miles Foy, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice).
239. HousE REPoRT, supra note 17, at 119.
240. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 668 (Jackson, J., concurring). This phrase is taken from
the third stage of Justice Jackson's analytical modeL See supra text accompanying note
226.
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original Espionage Act, Congress rejected an amendment that would
have given the President broad powers of prior restraint in times of
national emergency. That amendment provided:
During any national emergency resulting from a war to which the United
States is a party, or from threat of such a war, the President may, by procla-
mation ... prohibit the publishing or communicating of, or the attempting
to publish or communicate any information relating to the national defense
which, in his judgment, is of such a character that it is or might be useful to
the enemy. Whoever violates any such prohibition shall be punished by a
fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than 10 years,
or both: Provided, That nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or
restrict any discussion, comment or criticism of the acts or policies of the
Government or its representatives or the publication of the same.24 1
Wary of this proposal's implications for first amendment freedoms,
Congress rejected it and substituted in its place provisions for post-
publication criminal sanctions,24 2 including penalties for the disclo-
sure of federal cryptology secrets.24 3 Justice Marshall, in his concur-
rence in New York Times Co.,24 discussed Congress' rejection of a
more recent legislative proposal that also was similar to the ITAR:
In 1957 the United States Commission on Government Security found that
"[a]irplane journals, scientific periodicals, and even the daily newspaper have
featured articles containing information and other data which should have
been deleted in whole or part for security reasons." In response to this prob-
lem the Commission proposed that "Congress enact legislation making it a
crime for any person willfully to disclose without proper authorization, for
any purpose whatever, information classified 'secret' or 'top secret,' knowing,
or having reasonable grounds to believe, such information to be so
classified." 245
Because Congress twice considered and twice rejected prior
restraint systems like the ITAR, the constitutional validity of the
ITAR licensing scheme is very doubtful. Similar reasoning led five
members of the Court to reject the government's request for a prior
restraint order in New York Times Co. To varying degrees, Justices
Black,24 Douglas,2 47 Marshall, 248 White and Stewart24 9 concluded
that either because no statute authorized the restraint sought by the
Executive or because Congress considered the matter and decided
not to give the power to the Executive, such restraints were imper-
missible under the Constitution.
241. 55 CoNG. REc. 1763 (1917).
242. These are in essence the present day Espionage and Censorship Statutes, 18
U.S.C. §§ 791-99 (1982).
243. See 18 U.S.C. § 798 (1982).
244. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
245. 403 U.S. at 747 (Marshall, J., concurring).
246. Id. at 718 (Black, J., concurring).
247. Id at 720-24 (Douglas, J., concurring).
248. Id at 746-48 (Marshall, J., concurring).
249. Id. at 732 (White, J., concurring).
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Prior restraints on public cryptography are not authorized by
the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, and Congress specifically has
denied such powers to the President. Therefore, under the analysis
enunciated by Justice Jackson in Youngstown, 250 which was applied
by several members of the Court in New York Times,251 and adopted
by a majority of the Court in Dames & Moore v. Regan,2 52 the ITAR
is not within a national security exception to first amendment protec-
tion against prior restraints. The ITAR is thus an unconstitutional
infringement on first amendment freedoms because of its failure to
provide the procedural safeguards necessary to sustain a prior
restraint.253
V
A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL FOR LIMITED
PREPUBLICATION REVIEW OF PUBLIC
CRYPTOGRAPHY RESEARCH
The widespread use of computers and telecommunications tech-
nology has created an expanding public cryptography industry254
that poses an increasing threat to the protection of government
cryptology secrets.255 The prior restraints placed on this industry's
publications by the ITAR licensing system operate in violation of the
first amendment because of procedural deficiencies, 256 and do not
fall within a national security exception.25 7 The Public Cryptogra-
phy Study Group's 258 voluntary system of prepublication review was
unsuccessful. 259 And criminal sanctions after publication can not
meet national security concerns over publications in public cryptog-
raphy.260 Prepublication review of public cryptography research
may provide the only means to effectively meet the government's
national security concerns.
Publications in public cryptography are a scientific endeavor
that deserve first amendment protections.261 But the competing con-
siderations of national security and judicial competence auger for a
250. See supra text accompanying note 226.
251. See supra notes 246-49 and accompanying text.
252. 453 U.S. at 661 ("Justice Jackson in his concurring opinion in Youngstown . . .
brings together as much combination of analysis and common sense as there is in this
area. .. ").
253. See supra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
254. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 226-53 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 47-65 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
261. See supra note 112.
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tailoring of those protections to the specific problems posed by these
publications. The ideas expressed in public cryptography publica-
tions may not possess the same need for spontaneous expression that
ideas about political, economic, or social issues require.262 A short
delay in the publication of public cryptography articles may not
diminish their significance and scientific value. Although the
removal of portions of an article posing a threat to national security
could infringe upon individual liberties, a deletion might be consti-
tutionally justified when proven necessary to protect America's vital
interests. Given public cryptography publications' potential for
endangering the nation's safety,263 the history of judicial deference
in the national security area,264 and the complex nature of this
unique form of speech, limited prior restraints of public cryptogra-
phy may be constitutional.
Detailed legislation from Congress authorizing a system of prior
restraints on public cryptography is essential to the constitutionality
of such restraints. With this legislative authority, the President's
power to restrain publications that threaten national security would
be "at its maximum. '265 Whether such legislation would bring the
restraints wholly within a national security exception and thus com-
pletely outside of first amendment protections is unclear, however,
because the parameters of the exception remain unsettled.266
Assuming that a complete national security exception is not auto-
matically created by congressional approval of Executive restraints,
then the legislation should satisfy the procedural requirements of
Freedman and its progeny267 to adequately protect first amendment
freedoms and to ensure the validity of the restraints.
"[A]n act touching on First Amendment rights must be nar-
rowly drawn so that the precise evil is exposed." 268 Any legislated
prior restraint of public cryptography publications should, therefore,
delineate precisely the type of information to which the Congress
262. See supra notes 112 and 128 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 195-210 and accompanying text.
265. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638. (Jackson, J., concurring).
266. See generally Note, supra note 158. Although the issue of whether legislation is
sufficient to invoke a national security exception is unclear, what is clear is that the
exception will not operate to uphold domestic restraints in the interest of national secur-
ity without congressional authorization. See supra notes 217-21 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
268. Schneider v. State, 390 U.S. 17, 24 (1968) (invalidating leafletting ban on first
amendment grounds). "It has become axiomatic that precision of regulation must be the
touchstone in an area so closely touching our most cherished freedoms." Robel, 389 U.S.
at 265 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
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intends that it apply.2 69 To satisfy procedural requirements, the leg-
islation must provide that either prompt publication will be allowed,
or a court proceeding to restrain publication must be initiated in a
timely manner.270
Court proceedings must be adversarial in nature27 1 and must
place upon the government the burden of proving that the publica-
tion should be restrained.272 The government's burden should be to
prove by clear and convincing evidence 2 73 the particular facts
needed to justify the restraint;2 74 specifically, that the publication in
issue would cause serious, direct, immediate and irreparable harm to
vital national security interests.2 75 The legislation must provide that
only a judicial determination will lead to the imposition of a final
restraint,2 76 and that any temporary restraint issued while a court
order is sought must be for the shortest time possible.2 77 If a court
imposes a final restraint, the legislation must require the government
269. This definition may be difficult to delineate precisely without itself revealing
national security secrets. A somewhat less precise definition may be acceptable to the
Court due to the presence of national security issues, and a requirement that the govern-
ment must prove particular harm to the nation from a particular publication. See infra
notes 273-75 and accompanying text. Private and government cryptologists should aid
Congress in arriving at a suitable definition.
270. See Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59.
271. Id See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
272. Id
273. This is a stricter standard than the preponderance of the evidence standard usu-
ally employed in civil cases. The clear and convincing standard is applied in certain civil
cases where judicial caution is deemed appropriate. Such cases include those involving
fraud, a parol gift, the establishment of the existence and contents of a lost deed or will,
and the proof of mutual mistake to justify reformation of an instrument. 9 J. WIGMORE,
EvDENCE § 2498 (Chadbourn Rev. 1981). Because this system of prior restraints will
touch on first amendment liberties, judicial caution is warranted; thus the higher burden
of proof is appropriate.
The Court's perception of a lack ofjudicial competence to discern whether a particular
cryptography publication actually threatens national security might allow the federal
government to abridge first amendment rights when national security would not require
the prior restraint of a publication. This perception could result in judicial deference that
would make the government's burden lighter than it should be. This problem could be
overcome by establishing a special court comprised of judges with the necessary exper-
tise, or staffed with specially trained clerks, to make such determinations. Finally, secur-
ity procedures could be instituted to ensure that no national secrets are exposed during
the course of judicial proceedings. A similar special court was created for the operation
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11 (Supp. V
1981). That court issues warrants for electronic foreign intelligence surveillance by the
NSA and other federal intelligence agencies. See generally Note, The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act. Legislating a Judicial Role in National Security Surveillance, 78 MIcH.
L. Rnv. 1116 (1980).
274. See Speiser, 357 U.S. at 526. See also supra note 133 and accompanying text.
275. This proposal partially adopts the middle level standard advocated by Justices
Stewart and White in New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 730 (Stewart, J., joined by White,
J., concurring). See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
276. See Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58-59, supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
277. Id
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to stay this order pending appeal or to provide immediate appellate
review. 278 Finally, to ensure that first amendment liberties are
restrained no longer than is necessary to protect national security, a
researcher whose publication has been restrained by a final court
order should be able to reopen the order after a two-year period. At
this court proceeding, the government again should have to prove its
case, satisfying the same evidentiary requirements as required for the
initial restraint. This two-year period would ensure that the threat to
national security posed by a publication would be a continuing one,
and that first amendment liberties would yield to national security
interests only for so long as a threat to national security existed.2 79
VI
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court affords Congress and the Executive broad
deference in matters of national security. This is not a blind defer-
ence; the assertion of a national security interest, alone, does not jus-
tify infringement of individual liberties. While the protection of the
nation's intelligence operations, including its cryptology systems, is a
legitimate national security concern, the existing regulations
intended to afford that protection are an unconstitutional prior
restraint of cryptography publications because of their procedural
deficiences. Further, the regulations are not within a national secur-
ity exception to the first amendment, primarily due to the absence of
congressional authorization and conflicting legislative histories. A
prior review system cognizant of the first amendment could meet
both the national security and individual liberties concerns inherent
in public cryptography research. Careful and detailed statutory
authorization of such a system is needed.
Kenneth J Pierce
278. See Nat'l Socialist Party, 432 U.S. at 44, supra note 134 and accompanying text.
279. Cf. Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 546 (1923) (when a national emergency
justifies governmental imposition of rent controls, controls can not exist beyond the
emergency itself). To satisfy due process protections against government taking, the gov-
ernment may be required to pay compensation to a researcher whose publication is
restrained. See supra note 6.
* This Note has received the 1984 Earl Warren Prize, awarded by the Cornell Law
School to the student who prepares thepaper best exempliying the late Chief Justice's com-
mitment to civil rights.
